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Abstract  
Since the mid-1990s, welfare states have introduced various ‘activation’ policies 
designed to promote employment. Most typologies distinguish between a Nordic-
style ‘train-first’ approach focused on developing jobseekers’ employability, and an 
Anglo-Saxon ‘work-first’ approach that emphasises quick job (re-)entry. These 
typologies tell us what activation means for the unemployed (male) worker. But by 
ignoring the family, they overlook what activation means for the (female) parent-
worker with childcare responsibilities. To contribute to filling this gap, this article 
uses fuzzy-set ideal type analysis to compare twenty-two countries representing five 
‘worlds’ of welfare by how (de-)activating their labour market policies, parental leave 
provisions, childcare services and the scheduling of primary education are for lone 
mothers. It reveals that cross-national variations in support for maternal activation 
are not well captured by the Nordic-style ‘train-first’/Anglo-Saxon ‘work-first’ 
dichotomy. Hence, despite the greater attention to gender and ‘new social risks’ 
within comparative social policy scholarship, the activation literature remains 
gender-blind. 
Keywords: [active labour market policies; childcare; lone parents; mothers’ 
employment; typologies] 
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Introduction: Why We Need a Typology of Lone Mother Activation 
Since the late-1990s, welfare states across Europe and elsewhere have progressively 
converged on an ‘adult-worker’ model of welfare whereby all able-bodied men and 
women are required to be in paid work. Consequently, mothers are no longer 
excused from employment for the purposes of caregiving, but are instead subject to 
compulsory ‘activation’ (e.g. Lewis, 2001; Daly, 2011; Jenson, 2015). Yet, the precise 
meaning of activation and different ways in which welfare states seek to encourage, 
compel and prepare mothers for employment are not immediately clear. This is 
because an extremely diverse range of policy instruments can be subsumed under 
the label of activation. Moreover, these different instruments often have different 
characteristics and reflect sharply contrasting ideas about the causes of 
unemployment, why it is a problem, who is responsible for managing it, and what 
the best solution is (Bonoli, 2012).  
To disambiguate the meaning of activation and capture its nuances, a significant 
body of comparative social policy literature has emerged which organises the 
different policy approaches welfare states take in activating the unemployed into a 
number of ‘ideal types’. Most of the literature distinguishes between a ‘work-first’ 
or ‘employment-first’ approach to activation that seeks to pressurise the 
unemployed into (any) jobs quickly, and a ‘human capital development’ or ‘train-
first’ approach that instead aims to develop individuals’ long-term employability. 
While the employment-first approach tends to be more dominant in Anglo-Saxon 
states, especially the United States, the human capital development approach is 
more characteristic of Sweden and other Nordics (e.g. Lødemel and Trickey, 2000; 
Peck and Theodore, 2001; Eichhorst et al., 2008). Most of the activation literature 
agrees that there is no coherent ‘Continental’ activation strategy, as different 
Continental countries combine the employment-first and human capital 
development approaches to differing degrees (e.g. Barbier and Ludwig-Mayerhofer, 
2004). Meanwhile, Mediterranean and post-Soviet states are typically described as 
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weakly activating (e.g. Morel et al., 2012) or as emphasising the duties and 
obligations of the unemployed only (e.g. the Czech Republic and Portugal in Serrano 
Pascual’s (2007) typology), if they are considered at all. 
In focusing on the individual’s relationship firstly with the welfare state and secondly 
with the market, the human capital development/employment-first dichotomy tells 
us what activation means for the average unemployed worker. The problem is that 
this dichotomy overlooks the role of the family. As a result, it excludes childcare and 
other policies which support the activation of specifically mothers given the 
gendered division of caregiving within the family. In turn, existing activation 
typologies ignore the potential for policies to ‘de-activate’ mothers by reinforcing 
their caregiving, rather than supporting their employment. For example, certain 
states provide flat-rate ‘home-care’ cash benefits to stay-at-home parents with 
young children for three or more years. But in more than 90 per cent of cases, the 
mother is the recipient (Westlund, 2007; Duvander and Ellingsæter, 2016). 
Moreover, employment or the use of state-subsidised childcare services can 
preclude entitlement (OECD, 2007, 2011). So while home-care allowances are 
couched in gender-neutral language, in practice, the gendered division of care work 
means that such allowances can serve to de-activate mothers with young children 
(Westlund, 2007). 
This article addresses the shortcomings of the mainstream activation literature in 
relation to the specific situations of mothers. It does this by focusing on how labour 
market policies support lone mothers to reconcile activation and childcare and by 
treating childcare policies, parental leave provisions and the scheduling of primary 
school systems as integrated components of the active welfare state. Through a 
fuzzy-set ideal type analysis of twenty-two countries representing five ‘worlds’ of 
welfare (Anglo-Saxon, Nordic, Continental, Mediterranean and post-Soviet), I 
examine how a range of benefits and services beyond labour market ones alone 
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address the employment/childcare dilemma for lone parents1 . Hence, following 
previous feminist research (e.g. Orloff, 1993; Hobson, 1994; Skevik, 2005), I treat the 
situation of single parents as a ‘litmus test’ for all mothers. This is because mothers 
head, on average, 85 per cent of lone parent households across the OECD (OECD, 
2016). Therefore, lone parents tend to be lone mothers, who are, by definition, 
women maintaining households with children independently of men2. Thus, I use the 
terms ‘lone parent’ and ‘lone mother’ interchangeably and assume that if policies 
are good enough to allow single mothers to reconcile the demands of employment 
and childcare, they will be good enough for all mothers irrespective of any partners’ 
role in caregiving.  
Although mothers in couple households tend to have more and younger children 
than single mothers (Chzhen and Bradshaw, 2012), and welfare states often treat 
mothers differently according to their partnership status, policies for single mothers 
are still relevant for their partnered counterparts. Firstly, they give an indication of 
mothers’ ‘exit’ options from relationships. That is, the better the situation for single 
mothers, the more empowered partnered mothers will be to exercise voice within 
relationships and leave undesirable ones (Hobson, 1990; Orloff, 2009). Secondly, 
transformations in family structures and behaviour over the last four decades have 
made single parenthood a life course stage for increasing numbers of women 
(Bonoli, 2005). For instance, across the seventeen Western states included in 
Andersson and Philipov’s (2002) study, on average, one-quarter of women will spend 
at least some time as a single parent by age forty. So while lone parenthood is often 
transient, as single mothers often re-partner and children eventually leave home, 
lone parenthood is nevertheless a ‘new social risk’ to which a significant proportion 
of women are now exposed. 
The article reveals that cross-national variations in support for maternal activation 
are not well-captured by the dichotomy between a Nordic-style human capital 
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development approach and an Anglo-Saxon employment-first one. On the one hand, 
policies to develop mothers’ human capital are not as extensive across the Nordics 
as predicted by the existing activation literature and against the common 
assumption of a single ‘women-friendly’ and gender-equal Nordic model of welfare 
(e.g. Gornick and Meyers, 2009). Furthermore, policies in Finland are potentially de-
activating for mothers. On the other hand, policies towards lone parents in Australia 
and the United Kingdom are not conducive to rapid job (re-)entry against the 
characterisation of these states as employment-first. What is more, the findings 
show that the mainstream activation literature underestimates the extent to which 
certain Mediterranean and post-Soviet states are activating for mothers. Overall, 
these results indicate that despite the greater attention to gender and new social 
risks within the comparative social policy literature, the branch of this literature 
which focuses on activation still ignores women.  
The next section summarises existing research on lone mother activation. I then 
outline the methods in the third and fourth sections, followed by the findings in the 
fifth. I conclude by highlighting the contribution of these findings to the activation 
literature. 
Lone Mother Activation: State of the Art 
During the 1990s, research interest in lone mothers within the field of comparative 
social policy peaked. This was partly due to the increased prevalence of lone mothers 
and concerns about their relatively high rates of poverty and welfare dependency. 
But it was also because lone mothers offered an instructive category for analysing 
how welfare states resolved the employment/childcare dilemma for all mothers, 
independently of any partners’ contributions (e.g. Orloff, 1993; Hobson, 1994; Lewis 
and Hobson, 1997). Lewis and Hobson (1997) subsequently identified two main care 
regimes according to how they treated lone mothers: the ‘caregiver’ model, which 
assumed that all lone and partnered mothers were full-time carers; and the ‘parent-
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worker’ or ‘adult-worker’ model, which treated lone mothers and other parents as 
full-time workers.  
Since the late-1990s, however, welfare states across Europe and elsewhere have 
progressively converged on the adult-worker model (Lewis, 2001). As a result, 
participation in paid work or employment-related activities has become compulsory 
for lone parents (Haux, 2013). Several studies examine this policy development in 
detail. They show that lone mother conditionality in Anglo-Saxon states, excluding 
the US, is ‘light’ by international standards. Nevertheless, policies in Anglo-Saxon 
states, and increasingly Continental ones too, focus mainly on securing rapid job 
placement by overcoming practical obstacles to lone mothers’ employment (e.g. 
Strell and Duncan, 2001; Knijn et al., 2007; Finn and Gloster, 2010). Yet, as the family 
policy literature also shows, working parents in Anglo-Saxon states are given minimal 
support to reconcile activation and childcare as they are largely expected to make 
their own arrangements through the market (e.g. Gornick and Meyers, 2004). 
Meanwhile, despite some modernisation in recent years (e.g. Häusermann, 2006), 
Continental states (excluding Belgium and France) remain focused on promoting 
mothers’ caregiving over their employment (e.g. Leitner, 2003),. In contrast, 
activation in Nordic countries focuses more positively on integrating lone mothers 
into employment by improving their social skills and confidence, and widespread 
childcare facilities and comprehensive leave policies support mothers’ continuous 
employment (e.g. Rowlingson and Millar, 2002; Skevik, 2005), albeit less so in Finland 
and Norway (e.g. Ciccia and Bleijenbergh, 2014). 
Thus, existing studies of lone mother activation detail how certain welfare states 
activate lone mothers. Yet, they do not go far enough in capturing the full diversity 
of policy approaches. This is because they either focus on a single country at a time 
or compare just a small number (three to seven) of welfare states. Hence, the extent 
to which the policy approaches of these select few countries are idiosyncratic to 
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them only, or are instead representative of the approaches that other welfare states 
take, is unclear. Furthermore, because existing studies focus exclusively on Anglo-
Saxon, Nordic or Continental countries, not enough is known about the diversity and 
characteristics of lone mother activation policies in Mediterranean and post-Soviet 
states.  
More recently, Haux’s (2013) typology of lone mother activation captures some of 
the diversity missing in earlier studies by encompassing twenty-nine welfare states. 
She identifies three broad approaches to activating lone mothers. The first approach, 
voluntary activation, involves no compulsory activation. However, no country any 
longer conforms to this approach (author's update from Haux, 2013). Conversely, 
countries which adhere to the general activation approach expect (almost) all single 
parents to be available for employment. Most Mediterranean and post-Soviet states 
follow this approach. Finally, countries following the age of child approach exempt 
lone parents from activation requirements until their youngest child reaches a 
certain age. This age threshold varies from a few weeks (many Canadian provinces 
and US states) to a few years (the Czech Republic, Norway and most Continental 
states) or compulsory school age (other Anglo-Saxon states and the Netherlands). 
France and Norway additionally exempt the custodial parent from employment 
requirements during the first year of lone parenthood. Meanwhile, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, most Nordic countries and a few US states additionally use trained 
caseworkers to decide whether or not to impose job-search requirements case-by-
case given a single parent’s particular circumstances and/or the availability of local 
jobs and childcare.  
While Haux’s typology elucidates the approaches that a wide range of welfare states 
take in identifying lone mothers for compulsory activation, it still paints an 
incomplete picture of lone mother activation. This is because countries are 
categorised by variation on one dimension of lone mother activation only, namely 
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the point at which lone mothers are no longer excused from employment for the 
purposes of full-time caregiving and are instead subject to compulsory activation. 
Thus, Haux’s typology does not detail how welfare states seek to move lone mothers 
into jobs or support them to reconcile employment and childcare once they are 
deemed ‘work-ready’. This article therefore builds on Haux’s typology by 
incorporating these additional important dimensions into a more holistic typology of 
lone mother activation. Specifically, it compares welfare states by: (i) the strictness 
of job availability and search conditions imposed on lone mothers; (ii) lone mothers’ 
access to training measures to enhance their employability; and (iii) the degree to 
which family and education policies support lone mothers to balance employment 
and childcare. 
The analysis also goes beyond previous aforementioned studies of lone mother 
activation based on national case studies by incorporating a larger number (twenty-
two) of welfare states. For comparability with the mainstream activation literature, 
I include a range of countries representing the three main ‘worlds’ of welfare for 
which data are available. I also incorporate Mediterranean and post-Soviet states for 
which data on the key indicators are available. As aforementioned, previous studies 
of lone mother activation and the wider activation literature generally overlook 
these two regions; yet, they have received increasing attention within the family 
policy literature. Much of this literature initially characterised family policies in these 
two regions as rudimentary (e.g. Leitner, 2003). However, recent studies suggest 
that policies in some of these countries are actually highly supportive of maternal 
employment, potentially even to the same extent as in the Nordic system (e.g. 
Szelewa and Polakowski, 2008; Javornik, 2012; Tavora, 2012). Thus, lone mother 
activation in these states deserves greater attention and to be placed within 
comparative context, which is an aim of this analysis. 
 
9 
 
Method: Fuzzy-Set Ideal Type Analysis 
To compare a relatively large number (twenty-two) of countries across multiple 
(three) dimensions, I use fuzzy-set ideal type analysis. This method is more adept 
than traditional statistical methods to capturing variation between welfare states 
across multiple policy dimensions. This is because countries are assigned to ideal 
types according to theoretical and substantive knowledge, rather than statistical 
averages or degrees of statistical association. Consequently, fuzzy-set ideal type 
analysis is not prone to ‘outlier effects’, whereby a welfare state’s exceptionally high 
or exceptionally low score on one policy dimension only determines its overall 
classification within a typology irrespective of its scores on other policy dimensions 
of interest (Hudson and Kühner, 2010).  
At the same time, fuzzy-set ideal type analysis is better equipped for comparing a 
relatively large number of countries than other case-based methods. Case-oriented 
methods typically involve comparing countries on the basis of national case studies 
that capture the idiosyncrasies of each individual case. The volume and complexity 
of data generated make it difficult to compare more than a handful of countries in a 
systematic and thorough way. However, fuzzy-set ideal type analysis is unique 
among case-based methods in that it involves comparing countries using a set of 
fixed thresholds and agreed-on, logical principles (Fiss, 2009). By reducing the 
complexity of the data so that it becomes more manageable (George and Bennett, 
2005; Ragin and Sonnett, 2005), these thresholds and principles permit comparison 
of a larger number of countries (Ragin, 2008). 
In fuzzy-set ideal type analysis, each policy dimension of interest is defined as a ‘set’ 
to which countries have varying degrees of membership. To determine countries’ 
membership to each set, the set must be ‘calibrated’. This involves establishing, on 
the basis of theoretical and substantive knowledge, three ‘qualitative breakpoints’ 
or thresholds. The lower qualitative breakpoint of zero denotes a country as fully out 
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of the set, while the upper qualitative breakpoint of one denotes it as is fully in. The 
‘crossover point’ (0.5) signals that a country is neither more in nor more out of the 
set. Hence, for a country to belong to a set, it must achieve a score greater than 0.5 
to indicate that it is more in the set than out of it (Kvist, 1999).  
Set membership provides the basis for categorising welfare states into ideal types. 
With k being the number of policy dimensions or sets, there are 2k possible ideal 
types (Vis, 2007). Two logical principles underpin the organisation of countries into 
these ideal types. The first is the ‘negation principle’. This stipulates that the degree 
to which a welfare state exhibits the ‘negation’ or reverse of a given set is one minus 
its membership score to that set. For instance, if A has a membership score of 0.1 to 
set ‘𝑥’, then its membership score to the ‘NOT 𝑥’ set is 1 − 0.1 = 0.9. The second 
principle is the ‘minimum principle’. This states that a welfare state’s membership to 
an ideal type is the lowest of its set scores. Thus, if A has a score of 0.1 for set ‘𝑥’ and 
0.7 for set ‘𝑦’, then A’s membership to the 𝑥𝑦 ideal type is 0.1, the lowest of these 
set scores (Kvist, 1999). In other words, A is not a member of the 𝑥𝑦 ideal type.  
The most significant shortcoming of the method used in this study concerns the lack 
of objective standards for establishing the choice of indicators and thresholds which 
determine welfare states’ (non-)membership to each set (Ragin, 2008). To address 
this, I follow Marchal and Van Mechelen (2015) in using sensitivity analyses to 
measure the impact of a selection of alternative indicators and cut-off points on 
welfare states’ (non-)membership to each set. There is of course an infinite number 
of potential variations in indicators and cut-off points which could be tested. 
However, for parsimony, I focus on six alternative ways of operationalising the sets 
for which the strongest justifications can be made (Appendix 4). 
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Dimensions of Comparison 
This section gives details of the three sets which represent the dimensions of 
comparison. Reflecting the human capital development/employment-first 
dichotomy, the first set captures lone mothers’ access to training opportunities, 
while the second set measures the strictness of employment-related conditions 
imposed on lone mothers. To capture how welfare states help lone mothers to 
combine family and employment, the third set measures the degree to which family 
policies and primary school schedules support maternal employment. Where 
membership to a set is measured by more than one indicator, a country’s overall set 
score is the lowest of its scores on each of the indicators which captures that set 
(minimum principle). Appendix 1 provides details of sources. 
Opportunities for Training 
Comparative data that zoom in on training opportunities for specifically lone 
mothers do not exist. Nevertheless, two indicators offer adequate proxies. The first 
indicator, spending on training3, captures the priority given to improving the skills of 
the unemployed. Following previous studies (e.g. Nickell and Layard, 1999; OECD, 
2003; Vis, 2007), I use spending on training per person unemployed, expressed as a 
percentage of GDP per person employed. This is to adjust for cross-national 
differences in unemployment rates and economy size. It also ensures that high 
spending on training does not simply reflect high unemployment. The indicator is 
given by the following formula: 
Spending on training/total registered unemployed 
GDP/total number of employed persons 
 
=  
Spending on training/GDP
Total registered unemployed/total number of employed persons
 
12 
 
=  
Spending on training as a % of GDP
Unemployment rate, %
 
More simply, the resulting figure can be expressed as the percentage of GDP spent 
on training for every 1 per cent of unemployment. 
According to existing studies that focus on spending on all activation policies, 
‘activating countries’ spend 0.20-0.25 per cent or more of GDP on activation for 
every 1 per cent of unemployment (e.g. OECD, 2003; Vis, 2007). However, training 
comprises just one of five types of policy encompassed under the label of activation. 
Therefore, assuming that training commands at least its ‘equal’ share of the total 
activation budget in ‘activating countries’ – that is, one-fifth (Hudson and Kühner, 
2009) – the upper qualitative breakpoint (fully in) is: 0.25/5=0.05. Hence, when 
welfare states spend 0.05 per cent or more of GDP on training for every 1 per cent 
of unemployment, opportunities for training are considered widespread.  
Meanwhile, studies that focus on spending on all activation policies identify 
countries which spend 0.05 per cent of GDP or less on total activation policies for 
every 1 per cent of unemployment as having the lowest activation spending profiles 
(OECD, 2003; Vis, 2007). Again assuming that training commands at least its equal 
share of the activation budget (one-fifth), the lower qualitative breakpoint (fully out) 
is therefore: 0.05/5=0.01. So when welfare states spend 0.01 per cent or less of GDP 
on training for every 1 per cent of unemployment, opportunities for training are few 
and far between. The crossover point (neither in nor out) is the mid-point between 
the upper and lower breakpoints of 0.03 per cent.  
The second indicator gives a proxy of the extent to which lone mothers’ caregiving 
may be an obstacle to their participation in training programmes. It is based on 
survey data from the Adult Education Survey and Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC), 
which asked women to identify the reason(s) why they did not participate in lifelong 
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learning during the last twelve months, despite wanting to. Specifically, the second 
indicator is based on the percentages of women surveyed who identified family 
responsibilities as a barrier to their participation in education or training. The 
breakpoints are 40 per cent for fully out, 10 per cent for fully in, and 25 per cent for 
neither in nor out (Chłoń-Domińczak and Lis, 2013). When over 40 per cent of 
women identify family responsibilities as a barrier, this suggests strong cultural 
support for women’s caregiving, a lack of ‘care-compatible’ training courses, or a 
shortage or lack of information about the availability of childcare services. 
Consequently, lone mothers’ position as sole caregiver within the household is likely 
to prevent many from accessing available training opportunities. Conversely, when 
nine in ten women do not identify family responsibilities as a barrier to training, 
education/childcare conflicts are less likely an issue for lone mothers. 
Strict Conditionality 
To capture the extent to which welfare states rely on compulsion to activate lone 
mothers, the second set is operationalised by an index of the employment-related 
conditions and sanctions imposed on lone mothers not currently in employment 
(Appendix 2). The index comprises four distinct items which are given equal weights. 
Each item is measured by one or more sub-items, and scores for each item are given 
by the average of scores across these sub-items. Scores range from a high of five to 
indicate very strict employment-related conditions, to a low of one to signify weak 
conditionality.  
Item 1 draws on Haux’s (2013) aforementioned typology of the approaches welfare 
states take in identifying lone mothers for compulsory activation. Countries which 
impose compulsory activation on all or most lone mothers receive higher scores, 
while countries which are more sensitive to each lone mother’s particular 
circumstances receive lower scores. Items 2-4 are based on Langenbucher’s (2015) 
index of the conditions attached to unemployment benefits (see Appendix 4 for the 
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impact on the results of measuring the conditions attached to social assistance 
instead). Item 2 captures the strictness of job availability criteria and how much 
flexibility lone mothers have to turn down job offers. Item 3 concerns the degree of 
monitoring of lone mothers’ job-search activities, while item 4 captures the severity 
of sanctions in cases of non-compliance with employment-related conditions. The 
extent to which welfare states treat lone mothers differently from other jobseekers 
varies across these different indicators. Consequently, while scoring on certain items 
reflects the treatment of specifically lone mothers or mothers/parents more broadly, 
scoring on other items reflects the treatment of all jobseekers.  
Because eligibility for unemployment benefits in the United States is determined 
mainly at the state-level, scoring on the conditionality index is based on legislation 
and guidelines in Michigan. This is partly because detailed information on eligibility 
requirements are available for this state. Moreover, Michigan offers a good 
benchmark for ascertaining how the US in general treats lone mothers, since most 
of its policies match those in the majority of other states and are a mix of policy 
‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ (Blank and Haskins, 2001; Seefeldt and Castelli, 2009). 
Activating Childcare Policies 
The final set is also operationalised by a summary index. This index captures the 
extent to which a country’s family policies and primary school schedule support 
maternal employment, regardless of whether this is their intention (Appendix 3). The 
index comprises three items. Again, a country’s overall index score is the average of 
its scores across these three items. An overall score of one indicates limited to no 
support for mothers to be in or remain in employment, while an average score of 
five signifies strong support for maternal employment. 
The first item in the index captures the extent to which childcare policies support 
maternal employment in the three years immediately following childbirth. It is 
measured by three sub-items. Sub-item (i) concerns the duration of maternity and 
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parental leaves. Without access to paid leave, new mothers may be forced to 
withdraw from employment altogether. Very short leaves can have the same effect. 
Recent studies suggest that leave periods should be at least thirty to thirty-nine 
weeks for mothers’ employment continuity and career progression (Akgunduz and 
Plantenga, 2013; Keck and Saraceno, 2013). However, long leaves can be detrimental 
too as a result of substantial losses to mothers’ human capital, missed opportunities 
for career advancement, and potential difficulties in being re-employed by the same 
employer (Fagnani, 1998). Many studies mark one year as the turning point beyond 
which additional years of leave are associated with (marginal) wage penalties 
(Grimshaw and Rubery, 2015). Yet, Pettit and Hook (2005) find that the most 
detrimental effects begin only after around three years’ leave. Consequently, leaves 
shorter than thirty weeks or longer than three years receive equally low scores on 
sub-item (i)4.  
Sub-item (ii) covers the generosity of leave provisions. Leave paid at 70-80 per cent 
of previous earnings provides strong incentives for mothers to return to their 
previous employer once the period of paid leave expires in order to avoid a sharp 
drop in income (Gornick and Meyers, 2003; Wall et al., 2009; Bonoli, 2013). In 
contrast, low replacement rates give limited pressure for mothers to return to their 
previous employer once the period of paid leave expires (Bonoli, 2013). ‘Low’ is here 
defined as 20 per cent of previous earnings. National consumption surveys suggest 
that individuals cannot afford to maintain their standard of living when replacement 
rates fall below this threshold (Kvist, 2007). 
To capture the availability of formal childcare services for under-threes, sub-item (iii) 
concerns enrolment rates in formal childcare services for this age group. Low 
enrolment rates indicate a potential shortage of childcare services, while high 
enrolment rates suggest that services are extensive and generally accessible to most 
parents. Countries receive a score of five on this sub-item when enrolment rates for 
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under threes exceed 33 per cent, as this figure reflects the European Union’s 
‘Barcelona target’. To reflect enrolment rates in those countries which are ‘falling 
behind’ (37) this target, countries receive the minimum score of one when 
enrolment is below 15 per cent (Mills et al., 2014).  
The second item on the childcare index covers childcare policies for mothers with 
pre-primary education age children. Sub-item (iv) concerns enrolment rates in 
formal childcare services for three to five year olds. Countries with enrolment rates 
of at least 90 per cent receive the maximum score of five on this sub-item, again 
reflecting the EU’s Barcelona targets. Conversely, countries with enrolment rates 
below 70 per cent receive the minimum score of one to reflect enrolment rates in 
countries lagging behind the EU’s target for this age group (Mills et al., 2014). To 
avoid the distortion of a country having high childcare coverage but for limited hours 
only, full-time equivalent (FTE) childcare enrolment rates are used. These represent 
what enrolment rates would be if all those children attending formal childcare 
services did so on a full-time basis. FTEs are usually standardised by a thirty-hour 
week (e.g. OECD, 2016). However, because I am interested in the extent of support 
for maternal employment, I define ‘full-time’ as forty hours to reflect a full-time 
working week. FTEs are given by the following formula: 
FTE =
percentage of children in formal childcare arrangements
∗ average weekly hours of attendance
40
 
The third item in the childcare index covers policies for mothers with school-age 
children. It is measured by two sub-items. Sub-item (v) captures the length and 
continuity of the primary school week. Countries with school schedules that align 
more closely with regular, full-time employment hours receive higher scores 
(Gornick et al., 1997; Plantenga and Remery, 2013). In contrast, lower scores are 
awarded to countries with low school weekly hours or discontinuous schedules, 
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whereby children are sent home during their lunch breaks or have certain parts of 
the week off. Sub-item (vi) captures the prevalence of out-of-school services by 
average enrolment rates. Countries receive the maximum score of five when 80 per 
cent or more of children attend out-of-school services, as this figure reflects 
enrolment rates in countries with very high coverage of out-of-school services 
according to the OECD (2016). Conversely, countries with enrolment rates in out-of-
school services of below 10 per cent receive the minimum score of one to reflect 
enrolment rates in countries where coverage is low (OECD, 2016). 
Results: Lone Mother Activation Regimes 
Table 1 details the countries’ membership scores to the different sets and their 
classification into lone mother activation models. Countries belong to one of seven 
such models. The first two models, general coercion and delayed coercion, are both 
characterised by membership to the ‘strict conditionality set’ only. However, I treat 
them as distinct lone mother activation models to reflect significant substantive 
differences between them. Table 2 details each country’s overall membership score 
to its respective lone mother activation model. 
The first lone mother activation model is labelled general coercion. Most of the 
Central and Eastern European states, in addition to the Mediterranean states of Italy 
and Spain and the liberal state of the United States, are in this model. Here, 
joblessness is understood primarily as a behavioural problem. The aim is to push the 
jobless into (any) paid work by imposing strict employment-related conditions while 
simultaneously offering few training opportunities. At the same time, policies to 
support the reconciliation of employment and care are limited. Although primary 
school schedules for lone mothers with school-age children in the Czech Republic, 
Lithuania and Poland are generally conducive to a forty-hour working week, this is 
not the case elsewhere. Instead, insufficient out-of-school services or irregular 
and/or part-time school hours mean that working longer than part-time hours can 
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be difficult for lone mothers in the absence of informal sources of caregiving. Yet, 
the scarcity of part-time job opportunities across Central and Eastern European 
states may shut lone mothers out of employment altogether5.  
The second lone mother activation model, labelled delayed coercion, contains 
Australia, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Again, lone mothers’  
Table 1. Membership scores of twenty-two OECD countries to three fuzzy sets and their 
classification into seven lone mother activation models. 
Lone mother activation 
models and countries 
Opportunities for 
training 
Strict 
conditionality 
Activating 
childcare policies 
Model 1: General Coercion 
Bulgaria 0.00 0.63 0.22 
Czech Republic 0.00 0.56 0.36 
Italy 0.05 0.59 0.43 
Latvia 0.00 0.69 0.31 
Lithuania 0.00 0.61 0.40 
Poland 0.00 0.64 0.43 
Slovakia 0.00 0.77 0.28 
Spain 0.00 0.53 0.29 
United States 0.00 0.70 0.21 
Model 2: Delayed Coercion 
Australia 0.00 0.52 0.32 
Germany 0.30 0.57 0.44 
Netherlands 0.00 0.66 0.42 
United Kingdom 0.00 0.68 0.42 
Model 3: Care-Sensitive Coercion 
Norway 0.00 0.54 0.63 
Portugal 0.21 0.81 0.72 
Slovenia 0.00 0.80 0.75 
Model 4: Partial Activation 
Austria 0.74 0.57 0.22 
France 0.59 0.55 0.40 
Model 5: Holistic Activation 
Denmark 0.91 0.55 0.85 
Model 6: Optional Activation 
Belgium  0.19 0.47 0.78 
Sweden 0.16 0.48 0.69 
Model 7: Weak Activation 
Finland 0.44 0.38 0.35 
Notes: Scores are between 0 and 1 with bold indicating membership of a set (>0.50) and 
higher scores signifying stronger membership.  
Source: Own calculations. 
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inactivity is primarily seen as a behavioural problem. However, the subjection of lone 
mothers to compulsory activation is ‘delayed’ in this model by the prioritisation of 
mothers’ caregiving roles while children are small. In Germany, lone mothers are not 
required to engage in activation programmes until their youngest child turns three 
and has a guaranteed place in kindergarten. In Australia, the Netherlands and the 
UK, lone mothers are exempt from employment requirements until children start 
primary school. Furthermore, once lone mothers become subject to compulsory 
activation in the delayed coercion model, demands on their job availability are 
tempered by the promotion of a part-time worker/carer model. In Australia, the 
Netherlands and the UK, lone mothers are permitted to restrict their job availability 
to part-time or school hours on account of their caregiving responsibilities. 
Nevertheless, the under-provision of out-of-school care services and a short school 
day, which finishes before 3.00/3.30pm and before lunch on Wednesdays and 
Fridays in the Netherlands, mean that many lone mothers may have little choice but 
to work part-time anyway. Western Germany similarly promotes a part-time 
worker/carer model, with most pre-primary education services and primary schools 
Table 2.  Membership scores of twenty-two OECD countries to seven lone mother activation 
models. 
Lone mother activation 
model Countries (overall membership score to the model) 
General Coercion 
Slovakia (0.72); United States (0.70); Latvia (0.69); Bulgaria (0.63); 
Lithuania (0.60); Italy (0.57); Poland (0.57); Czech Republic (0.56); 
Spain (0.53) 
Delayed Coercion 
Netherlands (0.58); United Kingdom (0.58); Germany (0.56); 
Australia (0.52) 
Care-Sensitive Coercion Slovenia (0.75); Portugal (0.72); Norway (0.54) 
Partial Activation Austria (0.57); France (0.55) 
Holistic Denmark (0.55) 
Optional Activation Belgium (0.53); Sweden (0.52) 
Weak Activation Finland (0.56)  
Notes: Membership scores are between 0 and 1. Scores greater than 0.50 indicate membership with 
higher scores signifying stronger membership. 
Source: Own calculations. 
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finishing before lunchtime and just one-quarter of school-age children attending out-
of-school care services (Plantenga and Remery, 2013; Marcus and Peter, 2015).  
However, full-time childcare services for pre-primary education and school-age 
children are more widespread in Eastern Germany. In Eastern Germany, 68 per cent 
of three to five year olds have access to full-time day care compared to 25 per cent 
of three to five year olds in Western Germany (Zabel, 2013). Eastern Germany also 
contains a greater concentration of all-day schools, which run for around seven 
hours per day and include a supervised lunch period at least three days per week. In 
addition, three-quarters of school age children are enrolled in after school services 
operating until around 6.00pm in Eastern Germany, compared to one-quarter in 
Western Germany. Therefore, Eastern Germanyarguably sits closer to the care-
sensitive coercion model (Plantenga and Remery, 2013; Zabel, 2013).  
The third model, care-sensitive coercion, contains Norway, Portugal and Slovenia. 
While this model also emphasises welfare conditionality, there are greater 
provisions for lone mothers to externalise their caregiving in order that they can 
meet such conditionality. Pre-primary education services are widespread and 
available predominantly on a full-time basis. In addition, primary school schedules 
are either consistent with a forty-hour working week (Portugal) or complemented by 
widespread out-of-school care services (Norway and Slovenia). So while this model 
makes few specific provisions for lone mothers’ particular circumstances, there is 
nevertheless widespread support for full-time maternal employment, from which 
lone mothers benefit.  
The fourth lone mother activation model contains Austria and France. This model 
takes a more encompassing approach towards lone mother activation than the 
previous three models, in that it recognises both behavioural and structural barriers 
to employment. Thus, when children start pre-primary education and lone mothers 
become subject to compulsory activation, they are not necessarily compelled to take 
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any job as in the other models. Instead, they are permitted to participate in training 
and other programmes designed to help them secure a better job. Still, this model is 
labelled partial activation to signify that policy is not particularly supportive of lone 
mothers’ participation in full-time, regular jobs. Rather, it supports a part-time 
worker/carer role. This is evidenced by the fact that despite high enrolment rates in 
pre-primary education, services tend to be limited to part-time hours only. 
Furthermore, most primary schools either operate on a half-day basis (Austria) or 
send children home during their two-hour lunch break (France). Additionally, French 
schools are shut on Wednesdays, and provision of childcare services to cover this 
closure is insufficient (Plantenga and Remery, 2013).   
The fifth model, holistic activation, also relies on a combination of human capital 
oriented and employment-first measures in order to activate lone mothers. 
However, childcare policies are more conducive to lone mothers’ full-time 
employment than in the partial activation or weak activation models. Denmark 
epitomises this model: 88 per cent of three to five year olds are in full-time childcare 
and almost all school-age children attend out-of-school services that are 
complementary to the school day.  
The sixth lone mother activation model contains Belgium and Sweden. It is labelled 
optional activation to signify that although formal care services for children of all 
ages are widespread, conditionality is ‘light’ by international standards with limited 
targeted policies for lone parents. In addition, training opportunities to facilitate lone 
mothers’ career progression are generally lacking, and lone mothers in Sweden are 
likely to face barriers in accessing available training programmes because of their 
childcare responsibilities. So while there is policy support for maternal activation, 
policy does not explicitly set out to activate lone mothers. 
The final model, weak activation, comprises Finland. As in the previous model, 
policies to address the activation of specifically lone mothers are generally lacking. 
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However, childcare policies are not as activating as in the previous model. The 
availability of a home-care allowance until children turn three explicitly promotes 
lone mothers’ withdrawal from employment while children are small. Thereafter, 
policy appears to promote lone mothers’ part-time employment only. Pre-school 
enrolment rates in Finland continue to lag behind those in other Nordics and many 
other European countries. Furthermore, just half of first-grade pupils and around 
one-quarter of second-grade pupils attend out-of-school services, although 
provision has improved in recent years (Plantenga and Remery, 2013). Moreover, 
parents can continue to receive a reduced home-care allowance until their youngest 
child is around nine, provided they do not work longer than part-time (EU, 2016). 
Overall then, family policies in Finland potentially serve to de-activate mothers.  
Discussion of Findings and Implications for the Activation Literature 
Since the late-1990s, increased attention within the mainstream welfare state 
literature to gender issues and ‘new social risks’, which arise most acutely for 
women, gives the impression that this literature is now sensitised to the particular 
situations of women. However, by examining how policies from across a range of 
fields potentially (de-)activate lone mothers as a ‘litmus test’ for how welfare states 
help or hinder the employment of all mothers, this article illuminates a number of 
surprising results from the perspective of the mainstream activation literature which 
highlight its gender-blindness.  
In particular, the non-membership of most Nordic countries to the ‘opportunities for 
training’ set indicates that policies to develop mothers’ human capital are not as 
extensive as predicted by the activation literature and against the common 
assumption of a single ‘women-friendly’ and gender-equal Nordic model of welfare 
(e.g. Gornick and Meyers, 2009). While other studies similarly distance Norway from 
the human capital development approach (e.g. Lødemel and Trickey, 2000), 
Sweden’s non-membership to this set is more surprising. Yet, as Bonoli (2012) 
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argues, Sweden’s attention from the mid-1970s shifted away from training and 
towards job creation schemes designed to keep unemployment down during the 
crisis. Since the mid-1990s, pressures to accelerate transitions back into 
employment, amidst mounting evidence of the ineffectiveness of training 
programmes, have kept training expenditure low (Andersson and Wärvik, 2012; 
Bonoli, 2012; OECD, 2015). But Sweden’s non-membership to the ‘opportunities for 
training’ set also reflects mothers’ disadvantaged access to such training 
opportunities: of women who wanted to participate in training, 22 per cent could 
not do so because of family responsibilities; the corresponding figure for men is 15 
per cent (Eurostat, 2011). Likewise, despite high training expenditure in Finland, 
family responsibilities prevent 27 per cent of women from participating in training 
compared to 17 per cent of men (Eurostat, 2011). These findings support evidence 
suggesting that the division of domestic and care work remains highly gendered 
across the Nordics, and might help to explain high rates of gender segregation across 
Nordic labour markets (e.g. Lister, 2009). 
In addition, by incorporating childcare and education policies as indicators of 
activation effort, the analysis highlights the de-activating potential of Finnish family 
policies when it comes to mothers. Since the 1980s, Finland has sought to give 
‘parents’ (read: mothers) with children aged below three the ‘choice’ to stay at home 
through a home-care allowance. Yet, in practice, real freedom of choice between 
employment and care is limited by low provision of care services for under-threes. 
Furthermore, the availability of financial ‘top-ups’ to supplement the basic home-
care allowance rate encourages take up of this allowance, especially when earnings 
potential is low. However, to do so, many mothers will have to withdraw from 
employment altogether given that using day-care services precludes entitlement to 
the allowance (Meagher and Szebehely, 2012). These policy features, in the context 
of a gender-segregated labour market and gendered parental obligations, give 
strong incentives and pressures for mothers with very young children to take long 
and potentially detrimental career breaks (Mahon, 2002; Plantenga and Remery, 
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2009). Thereafter, a ‘flexible care allowance’ for parents working part-time or not at 
all until children turn nine (EU, 2016), in addition to short pre-school and primary 
school days and only moderate provision of out-of-school care services, do little to 
encourage mothers’ re-integration into full-time employment.  
Furthermore, by zooming in on the treatment of specifically lone mothers, the 
analysis highlights that the employment-first approach typical of Anglo-Saxon states 
is not imposed in Australia and the United Kingdom on lone mothers as strongly as 
on other jobseekers. In both countries, lone mothers are exempt from job-search 
requirements until children start primary school. And once they are deemed work-
ready, lone mothers in the UK can limit their availability to jobs that are compatible 
with school hours, even if no such jobs are available locally. Similarly, lone mothers 
in Australia can restrict their job availability to fifteen hours per week and may refuse 
employment in the absence of suitable or affordable childcare during school 
holidays. These policy features reflect stronger popular and political resistance in 
Australia and the UK to the erosion of income support for motherhood than in the 
US which, as this analysis shows, imposes strict employment-related conditions on 
lone mothers largely irrespective of their specific needs. This is rooted in historically 
higher female employment rates and less extensive state supports for maternalism 
in the US, as well as the stronger influence of conservative and racist discourses 
which blame various social ills on the supposed welfare dependency of black single 
mothers (Orloff, 2002). 
The analysis also challenges the mainstream activation literature’s assumptions that 
Mediterranean and post-Soviet states are weakly activating or focused only on 
emphasising the duties and obligations of the unemployed. By treating the active 
dimensions of childcare and education policies as integrated components of the 
active welfare state, the analysis suggests that policies in Slovenia and Portugal are 
actually very supportive of maternal employment. In fact, both of these countries 
25 
 
are situated in the same lone mother activation model as Norway on account of their 
comprehensive childcare policies. Historical policy legacies help to explain these 
findings. In Portugal, the exodus of men to fight in the colonial wars during the 1960s 
and 1970s, in a context of revolution and strong economic growth, facilitated 
women’s entry into full-time employment and the expansion of childcare services 
(Torres, 2006; Tavora, 2012; Rosa et al., 2015). A strong work ethic has surrounded 
female employment ever since (Moss and Wall, 2007). Meanwhile, the Nordic model 
has provided the blueprint for Slovenia’s childcare policies since the 1980s. Even 
under communism, Slovenia was more open to Western influence and had greater 
autonomy over its policymaking than other Soviet states following the Yugoslavia-
Soviet split in 1948. The aim of upholding gender equality, pedagogical goals, and 
the desire to keep female employment high in order to support economic growth 
have kept childcare policies activating following the transition to a market economy 
(Korintus and Stropnik, 2009; Formánková and Dobrotić, 2011). 
Overall, this article represents a first step towards incorporating gender into 
comparative scholarship on activation. Placing women at the centre of activation 
scholarship is important given that the success of the adult-worker model depends 
on a gender equitable order which both accommodates workers’ caregiving 
responsibilities and enables women to access an independent wage through the 
market on equal terms to men (Fraser, 2000). To build on this work, future research 
should likewise pay greater attention to the presence (or absence) of specific 
provisions within labour market policies which account for women’s fertility and 
caregiving. In addition, it should treat childcare and other policies beyond labour 
market ones alone which support women’s employment as integrated components 
of the active welfare state. Moreover, as this analysis shows, future research also 
needs to consider how policies in other fields potentially undermine the activation 
agenda’s employment goals by de-activating women and possibly other groups of 
jobseekers.  
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However, the social policy literature must also take a broader perspective that 
moves beyond the focus on women as simply mothers. Women’s labour market 
position continues to be undermined by gendered discrimination in the workplace 
and society at large that goes beyond the disadvantages stemming from childbearing 
and caregiving. For example, the ‘Heidi versus Howard’ experiment demonstrates 
how unconscious bias continues to undermine women’s labour market position. The 
experiment is based on a case study chronicling how Heidi Roizen became a 
successful venture capitalist. Among a group of students, half was given Heidi’s real-
life story to read, while the other half was given the exact same story but with Heidi’s 
name changed to Howard. The students were then asked about their impressions of 
Heidi and Howard. While they rated Heidi and Howard equally in terms of success, 
they thought Howard was likeable whereas Heidi seemed selfish and not “the type 
of person you would want to hire or work for”. Hence, because Howard matched the 
stereotypical expectations of men as providers, decisive and driven, he was liked. 
But because Heidi violated the stereotype of women as caregivers, sensitive and 
communal, she was disliked. This bias continues to be at the root of why women are 
held and hold themselves back (Sandberg, 2013: 39-40). Future research must 
therefore become more aware of broader causes of gender inequality beyond 
motherhood and care in order to develop a more sophisticated critique of the 
activation agenda and social policy literature more widely.  
 
 
 
 
27 
 
1The analysis focuses on lone parents who require childcare to cover all or part of 
their working week. This is seemingly the case for most lone parents since, on 
average, 59 per cent of lone parents across the EU have children under twelve 
(Eurostat, 2015). 
2 Shared parenting, whereby children spend roughly equal amounts of time living 
with each parent post-separation, has become more common (OECD, 2011). 
However, internationally, only around 7-15 per cent of care arrangements are shared 
(Skinner et al., 2007). Hence mothers retain exclusive or majority custody most of 
the time.  
3 ‘Training’ encompasses all institutional, workplace or other training programmes 
and apprenticeships for persons who are unemployed, seeking employment, or at 
risk of involuntary job loss. 
4In the Czech Republic, lone mothers are entitled to 147 weeks of maternity and 
parental leave combined compared to 138 weeks for partnered mothers. However, 
this difference does not impact on the Czech Republic’s positioning in relation to the 
‘activating childcare policies’ set.  
5Of women in employment, just 3 per cent in Bulgaria, 7 per cent in Slovakia and 8 
per cent in Latvia work part-time (EU, 2016). 
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Appendix 1. Data sources.  
Table A1. Sets and indicators for the fuzzy-set ideal type analysis with data sources. 
Set Indicators Source(s) 
Opportunities 
for training 
Spending on training per person 
unemployed as a percentage of 
GDP per person employed, 2013 
https://www.oecd.org/std/labour-stats/HUR-June14.pdf; http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database; 
https://stats.oecd.org/; Data for the United Kingdom are for 2011 and for France are for 2012 
Percentage of women who 
wanted to participate in 
education/training in the last 
year did not do so because of 
family responsibilities, 2011 
Data for Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States: 
http://www.oecd.org/site/piaac/publicdataandanalysis.htm; Data for all other countries: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/adult-education-survey 
Strict 
conditionality 
Index of the work-related 
conditions attached to 
unemployment benefits for lone 
mothers, 2014 
Criteria to determine when lone mothers are subject to compulsory activation: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21699763.2013.818566?journalCode=rjcs21; 
http://www.centrumvoorsociaalbeleid.be/sites/default/files/CSB%20Working%20Paper%2011%2005_April%2020
11.pdf; http://eprints.port.ac.uk/6319/1/6.PDF 
All other items on the index: 
Data for the United States: http://www.michigan.gov/uia/0,4680,7-118-26899---,00.html; Data for all other 
countries: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jrxtk1zw8f2-en  
Activating 
childcare 
policies 
Index of the extent to which 
childcare services, parental leave 
policies and the scheduling of 
primary education support 
maternal employment, latest 
years of available data 
Parental leave policies and costs of childcare 
http://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm 
Enrolment rates: 0-5 year olds 
Data for Australia: 
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/4402.0June%202014?OpenDocument; Data for the 
United States: https://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p70-135.pdf; 
http://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm; Data for all other countries: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/income-and-living-conditions/data/database 
Length of the school week: 
Data for Australia, Finland, and the United States: https://www.oecd.org/els/emp/4343133.pdf; Data for all other 
countries: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/documents/130910_egge_out_of_school_en.pdf  
Enrolment rates: out-of-school services 
Data for Australia, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States: 
http://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm; Data for all other countries: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-
equality/files/documents/130910_egge_out_of_school_en.pdf  
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 Appendix 2: Coding framework for the ‘strict conditionality’ set.  
Table A2. Coding framework for the ‘strict conditionality’ set based on a lone mother receiving unemployment 
benefits. 
Item Sub-items Score Description 
Item 1: 
Criteria to 
determine 
when lone 
mothers are 
subject to 
employment 
requirements 
Employment 
tests for lone 
mothers 
1 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
 
5 
No employment test for lone mothers 
Caseworkers decide whether to impose employment 
requirements according to individual circumstances 
Lone mothers are automatically subject to employment 
requirements once their youngest child starts primary education 
Lone mothers are automatically subject to employment 
requirements once their youngest child starts pre-primary 
education 
All lone mothers are subject to compulsory activation with few, 
if any, exceptions 
Item 2: 
Strictness of 
demands on  
availability 
during 
participation 
in activation  
Job availability 
during 
activation 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Participation in activation programmes does not require job 
availability  
Participation in some activation programmes requires job 
availability 
Participation in most activation programmes requires job 
availability 
Lone mothers should always be available for employment but 
are not required to actively seek employment 
Lone mothers are expected to actively seek employment 
Demands on 
occupational 
mobility 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
5 
Lone mothers can refuse jobs in other occupations/with lower 
wages indefinitely 
Lone mothers can refuse jobs in other occupations/with lower 
wages for >6 months 
Lone mothers can refuse jobs in other occupations/with lower 
wages for ≤6 months 
Qualifications or other factors are taken into account 
Lone mothers must accept all job offers  
Demands on 
geographical 
mobility1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
No demands on geographical mobility  
Lone mothers must accept a daily commute of up to 2 hours 
Lone mothers must accept a daily commute of up to 3-4 hours 
Lone mothers must accept a daily commute of >4 hours 
Lone mothers must be willing to move 
Number of 
‘other valid 
reasons’ for 
refusing jobs2 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
5 or more reasons 
- 
3-4 reasons 
- 
≤2 reasons 
Item 3: Job-
search 
requirement 
and 
monitoring 
Frequency of 
job-search 
monitoring 
1 
2 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
No checks of job-search activity 
Job-search activity can be checked upon request 
Infrequent checks of job-search activity (less than once every 3 
months) 
Regular checks of job-search activity (at least once every 1-3 
months) 
Lone mothers must often prove job-search activity (at least once 
every 1-2 weeks) 
Documentation 
of job-search 
activities 
1 
2 
 
3 
No formal requirement 
Lone mothers must regularly affirm they have undertaken some 
actions towards finding employment 
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4 
 
5 
Lone mothers must regularly affirm the specific actions they 
have undertaken towards finding employment 
Lone mothers must regularly supply details of employers with 
whom they have had contact 
Lone mothers must regularly produce declarations from 
employers confirming they have applied for a job 
Severity of 
sanctions 
Sanctions for 
refusing job 
offers3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
0-4 weeks 
5-9 weeks  
10-14 weeks  
>14 weeks 
Lone mothers lose eligibility to benefits 
Sanctions for 
refusing 
participation in 
activation 
measures3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
0-4 weeks 
5-9 weeks  
10-14 weeks  
>14 weeks 
Lone mothers lose eligibility to benefits 
Notes: 1Where demands on occupational mobility are subject to change over the duration of the 
unemployment period countries’ scores are based on the lowest expected commute time. For example, the 
Netherlands expects the long-term unemployed to accept a daily commute of up to three hours; however, 
jobseekers can refuse jobs with a daily commute of more than two hours during the first six months of 
unemployment. Therefore, the Netherlands scores 2 on this sub-indicator. 2Following Langenbucher (2015), 
‘other valid reasons’ are grouped into the following types: i) family or personal reasons (e.g. caring 
responsibilities, lack of child care, etc.); ii) poor health or disability; iii) other working arrangements of the job 
(e.g. part-time, temporary contract, anti-social working hours, etc.); iv) moral or religious reasons; and v) job 
is to replace workers on strike or lockout or working conditions do not comply with a relevant local/sectorial 
collective agreement. 3Average of sanctions for first-time and repeated infringements. 
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Appendix 3. Coding framework for the ‘activating childcare policies’ set. 
Table A3. Coding framework for the ‘activating childcare policies’ set. 
Item Sub-items Score Description 
Item 1: Policies 
for mothers 
with 0-2 year 
olds 
(i) Duration of paid leave 
available to mothers 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
No statutory right to paid leave 
<30 weeks OR >156 weeks 
105-156 weeks 
53-104 weeks 
30-52 weeks 
(ii) Average payment 
rate across the total 
duration of paid leave 
available to mothers1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
0-20 per cent of previous earnings 
21-36 per cent of previous earnings 
37-53 per cent of previous earnings 
54-69  per cent of previous earnings 
70-100 per cent of previous earnings 
(iii) Enrolment rates in 
formal childcare services 
among 0-2 year olds 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
0-15 per cent 
16-21 per cent 
22-26 per cent 
27-32 per cent 
33-100 per cent 
Item 2: Policies 
for mothers 
with 3-5 year 
olds 
(iv) Full-time equivalent 
enrolment rates in 
formal childcare services 
among 3-5 year olds2 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
0-70 per cent 
71-76 per cent 
77-83 per cent 
84-89 per cent 
90-100 per cent 
Item 3: Policies 
for mothers 
with school-age 
children 
(v) Length and continuity 
of the primary school 
week3 
1 
2 
 
3 
4 
5 
<30 hours 
30-39 hours with children routinely sent home for 
lunch 
30-39 hours a week with half/full weekdays off 
Continuous 30-39 school week 
Continuous school week operating for ≥40 hours 
(vi) Enrolment rates in 
out-of-school services4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
0-10 per cent 
11-33 per cent 
34-57 per cent 
58-80 per cent 
81-100 per cent 
Notes: 1Average payment rate is the percentage of previous earnings replaced by maternity and/or 
parental leave over the total duration of paid leave entitlements for a lone mother on average national 
earnings. Where maternity and parental leave are paid at different rates, a weighted average is used based 
on the length of each leave. 2Full-time equivalent enrolment rates avoid the distortion of a country having 
high enrolment but for limited hours only: (percentage of children in childcare*average weekly hours of 
attendance)/40. 3Where the length of the school day varies by region, as in many Central and Eastern 
European and Continental countries, the dominant time structure is used. 4The age of children and type of 
service covered vary cross-nationally. Country-specific details are available from the author upon request. 
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Appendix 4. Results of the sensitivity analyses. 
 
Table A4 gives an overview of the impact of a selection of alternative indicators and qualitative 
breakpoints on welfare states’ membership status to each set.  
I performed six sensitivity analyses in total. The first two concern the ‘opportunities for training’ set. The 
first sensitivity analysis tests the impact of a higher upper qualitative breakpoint in measuring spending 
on training to reflect when spending on activation policies per unemployed person peaked in Sweden 
during the early-1990s and reached around 60 per cent of national output per person employment. Thus, 
assuming that training commanded at least its ‘equal share’ (i.e. one-fifth) of Sweden’s total activation 
budget (Hudson and Kühner, 2010), I test an increase in the upper qualitative breakpoint from 5 to 12 
per cent. The mid-point accordingly increases from 3 to 6.5 per cent.  
The second sensitivity analysis tests the impact of basing membership to the ‘opportunities for training’ 
set on training expenditure alone, since expenditure data is most commonly used to assess the extent 
of activation. 
The third sensitivity analysis tests the impact of operationalising the ‘strict conditionality’ by the 
conditions attached to social assistance instead of unemployment benefits. This is to reflect that not all 
lone mothers may necessarily be able to meet the minimum employment record and/or earnings 
requirements to qualify for unemployment insurance within a given country. 
The final three sensitivity analyses concern the ‘activating childcare policies’ set. I test the impacts of: (i) 
using an alternative coding framework for enrolment rates of 3-5 year olds in formal care services based 
on Kvist (1999) and Szelewa and Polakowski (2008); (ii) defining ‘full-time’ childcare as 30 rather than 40 
hours; and (iii) double-weighting childcare policies for mothers with school-age children as in Gornick et 
al.’s (1997) index of maternal employment support. 
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Table A4. Shifts in fuzzy-set membership by variations on the calibration of indicators. 
Set Original indicators 
Main variations on original 
indicator/calibration 
Countries who enter the set 
Countries who 
exit the set 
Opportunities 
for training 
Spending on training per 
unemployed individual as a 
percentage of GDP per potential 
worker 
Alternative thresholds for spending on 
training: 12 per cent for fully in; 6.5 
per cent for neither in nor out; and 1 
per cent for fully out 
None France 
Percentage of women who wanted 
to participate in education/training 
in the last 12 months but did not do 
so because of family responsibilities 
Measured by spending on training only Finland; Germany None 
Strict 
conditionality 
Index of the work-related conditions 
attached to unemployment benefits 
for lone mothers 
Index of the work-related conditions 
attached to social assistance for lone 
mothers1 
Belgium 
Austria; France; 
Germany; 
Netherlands; UK 
Activating 
childcare 
policies 
Index of the extent to which 
childcare services, parental leave 
provisions and the scheduling of 
primary education support maternal 
employment 
Alternative coding framework for 
enrolment rates of 3-5 year olds: 1: 0-
19 per cent; 2: 20-39 per cent; 3: 40-59 
per cent; 4: 60-79 per cent; 5: 80-100 
per cent  
Czech Republic; Finland; France; 
Germany; Italy; Lithuania; 
Netherlands; Poland; Slovakia; Spain; 
UK is neither in nor out 
None 
‘Full-time’ enrolment defined as 30 
rather than 40 hours 
Czech Republic; Finland; France; 
Germany; Italy; Latvia; Lithuania; Spain 
None 
Double-weighting childcare policies for 
mothers with school-age children 
None None 
Notes: 1Data are unavailable for Australia, Denmark, Italy, Norway, Spain and Sweden. 
Source: Own calculations.  
 
